The observer group functioning was assumed during the post war periods of 1956, 1967 and 1973. It saw the institution of the first armed UN force to generate a stock between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Ten nations shared soldiers. Another force was instituted after the war between Egypt and Israel in 1967 to watch the peace agreement between the groups. This occurred during a period of high tension both locally and between the great powers. In 1974, a smaller UN force was instituted on the Golan Heights to maintain the boundary line between Syria and Israeli forces. The most widespread UN operation in the Middle East is perceived by the constitution of UNIFIL following the Israel invasion of the Lebanon in 1978. Its activity incorporated watching over the Israeli withdrawal, maintaining conditions of peace and security and assisting the Lebanese government re-establish its authority. (United Nations Peacekeeping Forces - History of Organization) Such tasks have burdened the efficacy of the UNIFIL to a great extent but the UN forces have made significant contribution by declining the level of conflict in the area. However, this accomplishment has not entailed without considerable cost. The UN casualties presently counts to more than 200. The UN has a significant part to play at the time of the struggle that erupted when the Belgian colony of the Congo attained independence in 1960. While the lawlessness and chaos were prominent in the region a UN force amounting to almost 20,000 was instituted to assist the Congolee government maintaining peace and order. It concluded that above all being engaged in entailing a ranging civil war to an end and banning the province of Katanga from seceding. It was while ensuring continuance of the UN mission in the Congo that Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was assassinated in an air crash. Among the other significant jobs may be mentioned watching and continuing the peace keeping force that was instituted on Cyprus on account of the civil war that emerged between the Greek and Turkish populations of the island. The UN mission has effectively created a buffer zone between the two ethnic races. The UN has in such and other fields played a considerable part in declining the level of rivalry. (United Nations Peacekeeping Forces - History of Organization)

Irrespective of the efficacy of the UN peacekeeping forces over the last 50 years some circumstances have proven to be intractable, and the peace keeping missions have associated with open-ended commitments. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform) the degeneration of the Soviet Union and the culmination of the Cold War have varied the international conditions in that UN Peacekeepers presently function. During the after Cold War regime, the stress has been diverted to the UN Peacekeepers from international conflicts to interstate conflicts. In case of the interstate conflicts, it is quite problematic to isolate the belligerent parties and enforce the previously agreed upon peace agreements. The United Nations no more has the capability to visualize the U.S. Or the U.S.S.R. To exert pressure to belligerent nations to conform to the internationally agreed upon principles of activity. In respect of the interstate conflicts it can be very difficult to compel all the subordinate units of rival organizations to conform to peace agreements even when the parent organization has earlier endorsed the peace agreement being violated by the subordinate unit. (Peacekeeping in Interstate vs. International Conflicts)

In case of the interstate conflicts it can be much problematic to compel all the subordinate units of rival organizations to adhere to the peace agreements even when the parent organizations has earlier endorsed the peace agreement being violated by the subordinate unit. The most cumbersome sphere of international rival is the consequences of mass human rights violations and genocide by the opponents. In case of the interstate rivalry there sometimes exist no clear 'good guy vs. bad guy'. In case of interstate rivalries, the internationally agreed upon cease fire and peace agreements are acknowledged by warring parties and then broken, in quick succession, for example, the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia - UNPROFOR - B generates an excellent illustration of the problems of peacekeeping forces in interstate conflicts confronts.

UNPROFOR was accorded a mission by the UN Security Council that was too costly in its scope to be continued by the forces assigned. The UNPROFOR was not installed with adequate numbers of troops to generate a strong deterrent to the hostile forces. UNPROFOR was not capable of safeguarding UN designated Safe Havens and resultantly, Serbian...

Moreover, the UNPROFOR forces were taken prisoners by Serbian forces in the areas around Sarajevo to discourage NATO air strikes. The serious problems UNPROFOR experienced in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a straight consequence of too large a mission without adequate deployments of troops to preserve the peace process they had deployed to implement Interstate conflicts that will entail to be the most problematic operations that the UN peacekeepers will be associated with. The UN peacekeepers are required to be adopting a specified mandate and sufficient umbers of troops to ensure success. (Peacekeeping in Interstate vs. International Conflicts)
Three missions - the ones in Lebanon and the Western Sahara and the one between India and Pakistan - normally were not accomplishing their mandates and as per the UN sources they had only a marginal role to more secure and stable environments. Three others incorporating the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East and the missions in Angola and Cyprus - were only partially accomplishing their mandates but had made some positive contributions to stability. The missions in the Golan Heights and between Iraq and Kuwait were effective in carrying out their mandates and sharing to stability in the respective regions of operation. More significantly however, six of the missions were not associated with the settlement agreements as called for by U.S. policy and diplomatic efforts to determine the conflicts had stalled or were stalemated. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform) Moreover, less effective was the 1992-95 missions in Somalia that was humiliatingly removed after confronting an attack from the competing forces. Explaining its ineffectiveness, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali indicated that the international community cannot impose peace. The peace can only come from the Somalis themselves. (Peacekeeping through UN)

During the past half century, the United Nations peacekeeping missions have not successfully led operations entailing for the exertion of force. This includes both missions authorized to apply force in consonance with the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the UN. Charter and those missions, whose consent calls for coercive action but do not specifically, authorize it. Partially, it is the confinements of the UN organization that put at risk the success of such operations. Several, illustrations assist exemplifying such facts. Out of the 42 peace operations led by the United Nations since 1945, the operations in Bosnia from 1992-95, and Eastern Slavonia from 1996 were specifically authorized to exert force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The four other UN peacekeeping missions like Lebanon imitated during 1978 and still continuing, the Congo during 1960-64, Rwanda during 1993-96, and the second phase Haiti mission during 1995-96 had no sanction but had the mandates entailing for coercive actions. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform)

Of such operations the ones in which the United Nations had full leadership were inhibited by the confinements mentioned earlier. To illustrate, irrespective of the Security Council calls for action, the United Nations could not attain adequate troops, equipment and reinforcements to successfully carry out the operations in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. With regard to Bosnia about 34000 additional troops were required to combat attacks on safe areas but only 7600 could be provided. Confinements of UN, command and regulations inhibited the commanders from successful deployment of forces to mission-critical regions in Somalia, Bosnia and the Congo. The National contingent regularly sought instructions from their capitals prior to deployment of troops and in some cases they deny to redeploy.

Lastly, the desire of UN to exert force in Somalia, Bosnia and Congo was considered uncertain at the basic considerations and resulted in the UN forces to drop credibility among the warring nations. The UN missions persistently depended upon the consent of the warring parties to continue operations. In Bosnia the UN officials were hesitant to exert airpower to combat attacks against the safe regions, partially due to the threats of retaliation, but also since they feared such action would make it emerge that they were taking sides in an internal fight. Besides the UN mission in Bosnia attained roadblocks, sought clearance from the warring factions before moving its vehicles, and allowed the warring factions to effect the deployment of troop contingents. Such activities partially replicate the fundamental organizational principle of ensuring that the sovereignty of its members is regarded at…